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Compositional analysis of contract-signing protocols





We develop a general method for proving properties of contract-signing protocols using a specialized protocol logic. The method
is applied to the Asokan–Shoup–Waidner and the Garay–Jacobson–MacKenzie protocols. Our method offers certain advantages
over previous analysis techniques. First, it is compositional: the security guarantees are proved by combining the independent proofs
for the three subprotocols of each protocol. Second, the formal proofs are carried out in a “template” form, which gives us a reusable
proof that may be instantiated for the two example protocols, as well as for other protocols with the same arrangement of messages.
Third, the proofs follow the design intuition. In particular, in proving game-theoretic properties like fairness, we demonstrate success
for the speciﬁc strategy that the protocol designer had in mind, instead of non-constructively proving that a strategy exists. Finally,
our logical proofs demonstrate security when an unbounded number of sessions are executed in parallel.
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1. Introduction
Contract-signing protocols allow two or more parties to exchange signatures fairly, so that no party receives a signed
contract unless all parties are able to do so. While there are no ﬁxed-round fair two-party protocols [14,22], it is possible
for two parties to exchange signatures optimistically. In optimistic protocols, the two parties may exchange signatures
if circumstances are favorable, but if either party chooses, they may ask a trusted third party to intervene and either
complete the exchange or refuse to complete the exchange for either party. Some of the history of optimistic contract
signing is summarized in [17].
Several methods have been used to analyze contract-signing protocols and either ﬁnd errors or suggest their absence.
In one previous study [23], which considers the same two protocols explored in this paper, the automated ﬁnite-
state enumeration tool Mur is used to ﬁnd errors or anomalies in both protocols. Game-theoretic concepts and the
MOCHA branching-time temporal logic model checker are used for analysis in [18,4], while another previous study
[3] uses unformalized inductive arguments about a symbolic model of protocol execution. Some negative results
about optimistic contract-signing protocols and the ability to achieve “abuse freeness’’ (a property discussed later in
this paper) are proved in [5], which uses unformalized game tree arguments. These previous studies only consider a
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bounded number of participants (usually an initiator, a responder, and a trusted third party) or involve arguments about
an often confusing number of cases. One reason that proving properties of optimistic contract-signing protocols is
difﬁcult is that there are typically three subprotocols, one allowing an optimistic exchange to proceed to completion,
one allowing a dissatisﬁed participant to abort the exchange, and one allowing either signer to ask the third party
to complete the exchange. Some appreciation for the inherent difﬁculty may be gained by reading the proof in [15]
which, although otherwise rigorous, overlooks the case leading to an error discovered by automated analysis and
reported in [23].
In this paper, we develop a method for reasoning about contract-signing protocols using a protocol security logic that
was originally intended for authentication protocols. Surprisingly, the logic proves appropriate to the task, requiring
only a minor modiﬁcation to accommodate the if–then–else behavior of the trusted third party. In addition, we ﬁnd
that a direct argument establishes correctness of a family of related protocols, without limitation on the number of
additional protocol sessions that may run in parallel. (The reason why parallel sessions are important is that additional
sessions may provide alternate sources of messages signed by one of the principals.) The formal proof proceeds along
direct, intuitive lines and is carried out in a “template’’ form that may be instantiated to provide correctness proofs
for two standard protocols and protocol variants that use the same arrangement of messages. In addition, it is not
necessary to consider interleaving of actions from different subprotocols, since the design of the protocol logic allows
properties of the entire protocol to be proved compositionally from independent proofs for the exchange, abort, and
resolve subprotocols of each contract-signing protocol.
Protocol composition logic (PCL) [7,6,13] uses a modal operator similar to Floyd–Hoare logic. Intuitively, the
formula  [P ]X  means that if  is true at some point in the execution of a protocol (in the presence of a malicious
attacker), then  will be true after agent X performs the sequence P of actions. The pre- and post-conditions may
describe actions taken by various principals and characterize the information that is available to or hidden from them.
PCLhas been used for a variety of case studies, including proofs of correctness for the IEEE802.11iwireless networking
standard [16], which includes SSL/TLS. While PCL was originally formulated over a symbolic model of computation
(used in this paper), we have also developed a computational interpretation [11] that considers arbitrary probabilistic
polynomial-time attacks. An aspect of the logic that is particularly relevant to the present paper is explored in [9],
where the idea of proving correctness of protocol templates is explained. In the template method, a protocol template is
an abstract protocol containing function variables for some of the operations used to construct messages. Correctness
of a protocol template may be established under certain assumptions about these function variables. Then, a proof
for an actual protocol is obtained by replacing the function variables with combinations of operations that satisfy the
proof assumptions. We follow this method for a family of contract-signing protocols, establishing correctness of the
Asokan–Shoup–Waidner [1,2] and Garay–Jacobson–MacKenzie [15] protocols by instantiation. Although the formal
proofs reﬂect the intricacies associated with any formal logic, the proofs seem to be direct encodings of natural lines
of argument. In addition to compositional reasoning about the combined properties of three independent subprotocols,
the protocol logic does not require any explicit reasoning about the possible behavior of any dishonest party, since
the axioms and inference rules are sound for any hostile environment. Furthermore, although the formal proofs in this
paper have been conducted manually, they should be accessible to automated proof techniques; we leave this as future
work.
We prove fairness by explicitly showing that if participantA takes a certain number of steps, then if the opposing party
B has a contract, partyA has one as well. The actions involved in this certain number of steps depend on whetherA is the
protocol initiator or responder, and the state reached so far. In effect, this form of argument shows that A has a strategy
to obtain a contract from any state by explicitly presenting the strategy. Further, these strategies are the natural ones
inherent in the protocol design. However, the logic proves unsuitable for showing directly that it is possible to complete
these steps—that is a modeling assumption that remains outside the formalism. Further, the safety-oriented logic seems
less adept for non-trace-based properties such as abuse freeness than game-theoretic approaches. Nonetheless, these
axiomatic, general proofs for unbounded runs offer additional validation of optimistic contract-signing protocols not
readily available through previous approaches.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Asokan–Shoup–Waidner [1,2] and Garay–
Jacobson–MacKenzie [15] protocols. Section 3 describes the protocol description language and logic and sketches
the extensions of the logic required to reason about these protocols. A summary of the semantics of the logic and the
proof system used in the axiomatic proofs in this paper appear in Appendix A. Section 4 presents the analysis of the
ASW protocol, emphasizing the compositional proof method. Complete formal proofs are in Appendix B. Section 5
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describes and proves properties of the template for optimistic contract-signing protocols of which ASW and GJM are
instances. Finally, Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2. Contract-signing protocols
In this section, we describe two contract-signing protocols. The description of each protocol is informal, using the
“arrows and messages’’ notation that is common in the security protocol literature. Since this notation is not sufﬁcient
for rigorous protocol analysis, more formal characterizations of the protocol actions appear in Sections 4 and 5, using
the protocol programming notation given in Section 3. Further discussion of the design, intended properties, and
limitations of both protocols may be found in the original presentations [1,2,15] and previous analyses of optimistic
contract-signing protocols [3–5,18,23].
2.1. Asokan–Shoup–Waidner protocol
The protocol of Asokan, Shoup, and Waidner (called theASW protocol henceforth) [1,2] consists of three interdepen-
dent subprotocols: exchange, abort, and resolve. The two main parties, an originator O and a responder R, generally
start the exchange by following the exchange subprotocol. If both O and R are honest and there is no interference
or message loss on the network, each obtains a valid contract upon the completion of the exchange subprotocol. The
originator O also has the option of asking the trusted third party T to abort an exchange that O has initiated. To do so,
O executes the abort subprotocol with T. Finally, both O and R may each request that T resolve an exchange that has
not been completed. Intuitively, this is important because there may be network delays or a lack of response from a
devious party. After receiving the initial message of the exchange protocol, O or R may execute the resolve subprotocol
with T. While the conditions for executing the resolve protocol are not speciﬁed as part of the protocol deﬁnition, the
resolve protocol allows the originator or responder to complete the protocol if either times out waiting for the other.
The exchange protocol consists of the following four messages:
O → R me1 = SigO{VO, VR, T , text, Hash(NO)}
R → O me2 = SigR{me1, Hash(NR)}
O → R me3 = NO
R → O me4 = NR
In the ﬁrst message, the originator O sends responder R a message consisting of data VO, VR, T identifying the
originator, responder, and trusted third party (respectively), the text of the contract, and a hash Hash(NO) of a nonce
(random number) NO chosen by the originator, all signed using the originator’s private signing key. The responder
returns a signed message comprising the ﬁrst message and a hash Hash(NR) of a nonce NR chosen by the responder.
Intuitively, each message indicates the willingness to be bound by the contract, but the exchange is not considered
complete until both nonces are known. The third and fourth messages exchange these nonces, so that both parties have
a complete contract.
In the abort protocol, the originator may ask the third party T not to issue a replacement contract, using the following
message and response:
O → T ma1 = SigO{aborted,me1}
T → O ma2 = Has me1 been resolved already?
Yes : SigT {me1,me2}
No : SigT {aborted,ma1}
aborted := true
In the ﬁrst message, the originator sends T a signed message indicating a request to abort a run of the contract-signing
protocol, together with the contents of the ﬁrst message of this run. If the third party has not already received a request
to resolve this protocol (see next subprotocol), then the third party can conﬁrm this by sending a signed message
indicating that the exchange has been aborted. Otherwise, the trusted third party must have received the ﬁrst and second
messages (in order to resolve the contract) and in this case the third party sends the originator a replacement contract
consisting of the third party’s signature on the ﬁrst two messages of the exchange protocol.
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One confusing aspect of the abort protocol is the meaning of the abort message. Since a dishonest originator can
send an abort message after completing the exchange protocol (in which both the originator and responder receive a
contract), the third party may issue an abort message even if both parties have a contract. Therefore, an abort message
from the third party does not mean that neither party has a contract. Instead, when the third party behaves honestly, the
abort message means that neither party can have a replacement contract issued by the trusted third party.
The resolve protocol may be used by either the originator or the responder to obtain an alternate form of contract.
Intuitively, this is useful if the originator and/or responder have progressed far enough with the exchange protocol to
be committed to the contract, but have not received the nonce from the other party. The two messages of the resolve
protocol are written below, as if the protocol is initiated by the responder R:
R → T mr1 = {me1,me2}
T → R mr2 = Has me1 been aborted already?
Yes : SigT {aborted,ma1}
No : SigT {me1,me2}
resolved := true
The protocol deﬁnition in [2] provides two forms of contract:
{me1, NO,me2, NR} (standard contract)
SigT {me1,me2} (replacement contract)
As suggested above, the ﬁrst form is the contract that both parties will have after the exchange subprotocol is
successfully completed. The second is the form of contract issued by the third party, on request.
This protocol was designed to provide fairness to both parties and trusted third party accountability. Fairness is the
property that either both parties may each obtain a contract (of one form or the other) or neither may obtain a contract.
Third party accountability is a property involving evidence to show misbehavior by any third party that acts dishonestly.
In the case that the third party behaves dishonestly, such as by issuing both an abort message and a replacementmessage,
the protocol design should guarantee that a collection of network messages will show deﬁnitively that the third party
has misbehaved.
2.2. Garay–Jakobsson–MacKenzie protocol
The protocol of Garay, Jakobsson, and MacKenzie (called the GJM protocol henceforth) [15] is closely related to the
ASW protocol. Both protocols provide a four-step exchange subprotocol and two-step abort and resolve subprotocols.
Although the ASW and GJM protocols have similar structure, the contents of the messages differ. Unlike the ASW
protocol, the GJMprotocol is designed to guarantee abuse-freeness in addition to fairness and third party accountability.
These properties are formally stated and proved in Section 5. Intuitively, abuse-freeness involves the inability of any
party to prove control of the outcome to an outsider. More speciﬁcally, the originator O controls the outcome, at a
certain point in execution of the contract-signing protocol, if O can either choose to give both parties a contract or
choose to prevent both parties from obtaining a contract. If O controls the outcome, and can demonstrate this to an
outsider, then O might be able to “abuse’’ R by using R’s commitment to get a better contract from an outsider. For
example, if O can show an alternative buyer that R will pay a certain amount for an item O has offered for sale, then
the alternative buyer may offer more, and O can abort the contract to sell the item to R.
The GJM protocol relies on the cryptographic primitive called private contract signature (PCS). We write
PCSO(m,R, T ) for party O’s PCS of text m for party R (known as the designated veriﬁer) with respect to third
party T. The main properties of PCS are as follows: (a) PCSO(m,R, T ) can be veriﬁed by R like a conventional
signature; (b) PCSO(m,R, T ) can be feasibly computed by either O, or R, but nobody else; (c) PCSO(m,R, T ) can
be converted into a conventional signature by either O, or T, but nobody else, including R. For the purposes of this
study, we focus on the third-party accountable version of PCS, in which the converted signatures produced by O and T
can be distinguished. We will call them SigO(m) and T _SigO(m), respectively. Unlike PCS, converted signatures are
universally veriﬁable by anybody in possession of the correct signature veriﬁcation key. An efﬁcient discrete log-based
PCS scheme is presented in [15].
This protocol was designed to provide fairness to both parties and trusted third party accountability. The formal
presentation of the protocol and its properties are in Section 5.
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TheGJM exchange protocol is similar to theASWexchange protocol, using PCSs instead of regular digital signatures
in the ﬁrst two messages, and with actual signatures on the contract m exchanged in the last two messages:
O → R me1 = PCSO(m,R, T )
R → O me2 = PCSR(m,O, T )
O → R me3 = SigO(m)
R → O me4 = SigR(m)
The GJM abort protocol is similar in spirit to the ASW abort protocol described above
O → T ma1 = SigO(m,O,R, abort)
T → O ma2 = Has O or R resolved already?
Yes : SigR(m) if R has resolved, or
T _SigR(m) if O has resolved
No : SigT (ma1)
aborted := true
When T receives an abort request, T checks its permanent database of past actions to decide how to proceed.
If T has not previously been requested to resolve this instance of the protocol, T marks m as aborted in its permanent
database and sends an abort token to O. If m is already marked as resolved, this means that T has previously resolved
this exchange in response to an earlier request. As a result of the resolution procedure (described below), honest T
must have obtained both O’s and R’s universally veriﬁable signatures of m. Therefore, in response to O’s abort request,
T forwards O either SigR(m) or T _SigR(m), either of which can serve as a proof that R indeed signed m.
The GJM resolve protocol is also similar in spirit to the ASW resolve protocol described above
R → T mr1 = PCSO(m,R, T ), SigR(m)
T → R mr2 = Has O aborted already?
Yes : Send SigT (SigO(m,O,R, abort))
No : Has O resolved already?
Yes : Send SigO(m)
No : Store SigR(m)
Convert PCSO(m,R, T ) to T _SigO(m)
Send T _SigO(m)
resolved := true
Either party may request that T resolve the exchange. In order to do so, the party must possess the other party’s
PCS of the contract (with T as the designated third party), and submit it to T along with its own universally veriﬁable
signature of the contract. Therefore, R can send a resolve request at any time after receiving me1, and O can do so
at any time after receiving me2. When T receives a resolve request, it checks whether the contract is already marked
as aborted. If it is, T replies with the abort token. If the contract has been resolved by the other party, T replies with
that party’s signature. Finally, if the contract has been neither aborted, nor resolved by the other party, T converts PCS




We use a simple “protocol programming language” based on [13,7,6] to represent a protocol by a set of roles, such
as “originator”, “responder” or “thirdparty”, each role specifying a sequence of actions to be executed by a honest
participant. The syntax of terms and actions is given in Table 1.
We use Xˆ, Yˆ , . . . as names for protocol participants. Since a particular participant might be involved in more than
one session at a time, we will give unique names to sessions and use a pair (Xˆ, s) to designate a particular thread being
executed by Xˆ. Although this notational convention may seem strange initially, we generally use a Roman capital letter
X to refer to an arbitrary thread of agent Xˆ.
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Table 1
Syntax of protocol terms and actions
Terms
t ::= x |K |X | n | 〈t, t〉 | SIGK {|t |} |HASH{|t |}
Actions
a ::= new n |match t/t |send t |receive x |if t t1 : P1; . . . tn : Pn;fi
Terms are expressions for messages and their parts, including variables x, keys K, threads X, nonces n, and pairs
〈t, t〉. We write SIGK{|t |} for term t signed with key K, and HASH{|t |} for the hash of t. Since the protocols we consider
assume a public-key infrastructure, we may write a thread name for its associated key. The relation m ⊆ m′ indicates
that m is a subterm of m′ ∈ t .
Actions include nonce generation, pattern matching, and communication. The action new n chooses a new nonce
n different from all other values associated with protocol execution to this point. The action match t1/t2 matches a
term t1 against a term t2 representing a pattern. A variable occurring in the pattern t2 will thereafter be replaced by
the appropriate subterm of t1. For example, match x/SIGK{|y|} will verify that x, which might have been a message
received through communication, is a valid signature with key K. In this case, y will subsequently refer to the message
that is signed in x. If x is not a valid signature with the correct key, then this action cannot occur, and subsequent actions
in the remainder of the protocol role will not occur either. Send and receive actions, send t and receive x are largely
straightforward.
An action not considered in previous papers on PCL is the “if” construct in the spirit of Dijkstra’s guarded commands
that we add here. This construct is used to express conditional behavior of protocol participants. This construct behaves
like a generalization of pattern matching. If i is the lowest number such that t matches ti , then if t t1 : P1; . . . tn :
Pn; fi simpliﬁes to match t/ti : Pi; In other words, this conditional action performs Pi iff t is equal to ti .
The operational semantics of the protocol programming language is deﬁned in the style of process calculus (see [6]).
Execution begins from an initial conﬁguration. The initial conﬁguration of a protocol Q is determined by: (1) a set of
principals, some of which are designated as honest; (2) a multiset of roles (programs determining a sequence of actions)
constructed by assigning roles of Q to threads of honest principals; (3) a collection of intruder actions, which may
use keys of dishonest principals; (4) a ﬁnite number of buffer actions, enough to accommodate every send action by
honest threads and the intruder threads. A runR is a sequence of reaction steps from the initial conﬁguration, subject to
the constraint that every send/receive reaction step happens between some buffer action and some (nonbuffer) thread.
A reaction step is either a local action executed by a principal or a communication action which involves a send action
by some thread and a receive action by another.
3.2. Protocol logic
The basic protocol logic and proof system are developed in [12,7,8,10], with [6] providing a relatively succinct
presentation of a consistent form that unfortunately differs frommore recent papers in some syntactic ways. A summary
of the relevant portions of the semantics and proof system appears in Appendix A.
The formulas of the logic are given by the grammar in Table 2. Here, t and X denote a term and a thread, respectively.
As mentioned above, we use the word thread to refer to a principal executing an instance of a role, and we use X to
refer to a thread belonging to principal Xˆ. We use  and  to indicate predicate formulas, and m to indicate a generic
term we call a “message”.
Most protocol proofs use formulas of the form [P ]X, which means that after actions P are executed in thread X,
starting from a state where formula  is true, formula  is true about the resulting state of X. Here are the informal
interpretations of the predicates:
Has(X, x) means principal Xˆ possesses information x in the thread X. This is “possess” in the limited sense of having
either generated the data or received it in the clear or received it under encryption where the decryption key is known.
Send(X,m) means principal Xˆ sends message m in the thread X.
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Table 2
Syntax of the logic
Action formulas
a ::= Send(X, t) |Receive(X, t) |New(X, t) |Decrypt(X, t) |Verify(X, t) |Start(X)
Formulas
 ::= a |Has(X, t) |Computes(X, t) |Honest(Xˆ) | ∧  | ¬ | ∃x. |
Modal form
 ::=  [P ]X 
Receive(X,m), New(X, t), Decrypt(X, t), Verify(X, t) similarly mean that receive, new, decrypt and signature
veriﬁcation actions occur.
Honest(Xˆ) means the actions of principal Xˆ in the current run are precisely an interleaving of initial segments of traces
of a set of roles of the protocol. In other words, Xˆ assumes some set of roles and does exactly the actions prescribed
by them.
Computes(X,m) means that a principal Xˆ possesses enough information in thread X to build term m of some type.
For example, a principal can possess an encrypted message if he received it in the past as a part of some message or
if he possesses the plaintext and the encryption key. Computes is used to describe the latter case.
Start(X) means that the thread X did not execute any actions in the past.
4. Analysis of the ASW protocol
The ASW protocol [1,2] consists of three interdependent subprotocols: exchange, abort, and resolve. We ﬁrst show
in Section 4.1 how to model these protocols as programs. Section 4.2 discusses the compositional proof method used
in proving the security properties of the protocol. Section 4.3 contains the formal deﬁnitions and proof sketches of
the fairness and accountability properties. The complete formal proofs are in Appendix B. We believe that the proof
method illustrated by this application will be useful for analyzing similar properties of related protocols.
We emphasize two high-level aspects of this method which distinguishes it from existing analysis techniques. First, it
is compositional: the security guarantees offered by theASWprotocol are proved by combining independent guarantees
offered by the exchange, abort, and resolve subprotocols. Second, the proofs follow the design intuition. In particular,
in the fairness proofs, we demonstrate that the appropriate strategy for a party to obtain a contract (via the abort/resolve
protocols) depending on its local state, actually works. For example, if after sending the ﬁrst message, the initiator
executes the abort protocol, then he gets the contract if his peer has the contract. The fact that we prove a speciﬁc
strategy works as opposed to proving one exists distinguishes us from prior game-theoretic analyses [4]. Also, it seems
useful to have analysis techniques which can take advantage of and inform protocol design principles.
4.1. Modelling protocol parties
The roles of the exchange subprotocol are given in Fig. 1, with one program ExchangeInit for the initiator of the
protocol and one program ExchangeResp for the responder. A role consists of static input parameters, and a list of
actions to be executed. For example, ExchangeInit represents the program for initiator Xˆ starting a protocol with the
responder Yˆ and trusted third party Tˆ with contract text. The intuitive reading of the sequence of actions is: generate
a new nonce, send a signature representing a commitment to the contract, receive a message, check that it is a valid
commitment for Yˆ , release the nonce, receive a message and check that it is a valid decommitment corresponding to
the responders commitment.
The ASW protocol provides for two kinds of contracts. The ﬁrst one is called a standard contract. Standard contracts
are obtained if the execution of the protocol successfully ﬁnishes without any party aborting or resolving the protocol.
They are formally deﬁned as follows:
s(Xˆ, Yˆ , Tˆ , text, x, y) ≡ SIG
Xˆ





{|Xˆ, Yˆ , Tˆ , text,HASH{|x|}|},HASH{|y|}|}, y.
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Fig. 1. Roles of the ASW protocol.
The second kind is called a replacement contract. It is always built by the trusted third party to resolve a
protocol
r(Xˆ, Yˆ , Tˆ , text, w, z) ≡ SIGT {|SIGXˆ{|Xˆ, Yˆ , Tˆ , text, w|}, SIGYˆ {|SIGXˆ{|Xˆ, Yˆ , Tˆ , text, w|}, z|}|}.
To improve readability, in the subsequent proofs we often write s and r instead of s(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y) and
r(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text,HASH{|w|}, z), respectively. In the following, we often have to reason about the messages that are
exchanged during the protocol execution. Especially, the ﬁrst and second message will be important as they grant the
respective parties the ability to resolve a protocol execution. For reasons of readability, we introduce syntactic shortcuts
msg1 and msg2 for these messages, i.e.,
msg1 ≡ SIGAˆ{|Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text,HASH{|x|}|},
msg2 ≡ SIGBˆ{|SIGAˆ{|Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text,HASH{|x|}|},HASH{|y|}|}.
The abort and resolve subprotocols for the initiator and the responder are given in Fig. 1. We use the “if” construct
to model the fact that agents do not know in advance which of the two possible responses they will receive from the
trusted third party Tˆ .
In analyzing the ASW protocol, we do not model the program of the trusted third party explicitly. Instead, we capture
its desired behavior by a set of logical formulas—1T and 
2
T below. Using the extensions of the logic presented in this
paper, it is easy to write down the program for the trusted third party and prove that these logical formulas represent
properties of its protocol. Since the proofs are similar to other proofs presented in this paper, we omit them here.
1T = {Honest(Tˆ ) ∧ Send(T , Tˆ , Bˆ, r(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, z)) ⊃ ¬Send(T , Tˆ , Aˆ, SIGTˆ {|Aborted,msg1|})},
2T = {Honest(Tˆ ) ∧ Send(T , Tˆ , Aˆ, SIGTˆ {|Aborted,msg1|}) ⊃ Receive(T , Aˆ, Tˆ , SIGAˆ{|Abort,msg1|})}.
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Fig. 2. Possible runs for the initiator in the ASW protocol.
1T says that Tˆ will never issue both a replacement contract and the abort token. 
2
T says that Tˆ will never send an
abort token unless A has initiated the abort subprotocol for the corresponding commitment.
4.2. Compositional proof method
In this section, we sketch the method used to prove properties of the protocol. In the ASW protocol, there is more
than one intended run. For example, after sending the ﬁrst message, the initiator can decide not to wait for the response
but to run the abort subprotocol instead. Using the protocol logic, we are able to analyze the components of the ASW
protocol independently, and combine the proofs using the composition theorems presented in [7,6]. We focus primarily
on the guarantees for the initiator in the protocol.
Runs of the ASW protocol: There are three possible execution scenarios for the initiator in the ASW protocol. The
initiator can complete the exchange subprotocol; complete the resolve subprotocol after sending the third message of
the exchange subprotocol; or complete the abort protocol after sending the ﬁrst message of the exchange subprotocol
(Fig. 2). The design intent was that each of these three combinations should result in the initiator obtaining a valid
contract whenever the responder already has one. We will use ExchangeInit3(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text) to denote the preﬁx of
the initiator role in the protocol up to and including the second send action (send of the third message in the protocol)
and ExchangeInit1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text) to denote the preﬁx up to and including the ﬁrst send action.
Formulas of the logic and sequential composition: Most logical statements that we use are of the form  [P]A.
The intuitive reading of such statement is: “Given that the set of assumptions  holds in every state, and a thread A has
ﬁnished executing the program P starting in a state where  holds, then in the resulting state  holds.’’
In this paper,  will typically contain a set of assumptions about the behavior of the trusted third party T which
can be later discharged by analyzing T’s program. For example, one of the assumptions we use is that T never sends a
replacement contract if it has issued the abort token in the past.
We will combine statements about different subprotocols using sequential composition of the roles. Here we state a
variant of the theorem from [6] that we use for this purpose. The precise form in which this theorem will be employed
will become clearer in the next section.
Theorem 1 (Sequential composition). For sets of assumptions 1 and 2, programs P and Q, and formulas ,  and
 if 1 [P]X and 2  [Q]X than 1 ∪ 2 [P;Q], where P;Q is a sequential composition of programs P
and Q.
4.3. Proving protocol properties
In this section, we show how to express and prove the desired properties in the underlying logic using the described
proof method. Complete formal proofs are given in Appendix B. Here, we sketch the proof structure and emphasize
the crucial steps.
4.3.1. Fairness
We start with the fairness property of the protocol. Informally, fairness means that after the protocol has been
successfully completed, either both parties have a signed contract or neither does. In our model, fairness is expressed
using a set of logical formulas. As described in the previous section, we look separately at the three possible scenarios
for the initiator to complete the protocol.
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Initiator completes the exchange subprotocol: Formula 0 states that the initiator A has a valid contract after the
successful execution of the exchange protocol. This is the optimistic part of the protocol
0 ≡ Start(A)
[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)]A
Has(A, s(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y))
The formal proof of this property is given in Appendix B. We show that
0. (1)
Therefore, in this scenario fairness holds without any assumptions about the behavior of the trusted third party or
the responder in the protocol.
Initiator runs the abort protocol: If A started the protocol as the initiator but did not complete it, we want to show
that whenever some other party has a valid contract, then A will get the replacement contract if it executes the abort
subprotocol after sending the ﬁrst message. This part of the analysis is done using the compositional proof method.
First, we identify a sufﬁcient precondition that needs to hold in order for the initiator to get the contract after executing
the abort subprotocol; then we show that the precondition is satisﬁed if the initiator only executed his role upto the ﬁrst
send action.
A sufﬁcient precondition for this to hold is that A’s nonce x has been kept secret, i.e.,
1 = HasAlone(A, x),
where HasAlone(X, t) is deﬁned by HasAlone(X, t) ≡ Has(X, t) ∧ (Has(Y, t) ⊃ X = Y . It is easy to verify that
1 holds in the state where A has only sent the ﬁrst message of the protocol, since this message only contains the hash
of x.
The property of the abort subprotocol needed for fairness is given below. Informally, it states that if at some state
1 holds then, after executing the abort subprotocol, if some thread X possesses any contract (standard or replacement)
corresponding to A’s nonce x and if T is honest, A will posses the replacement contract corresponding to the same
nonce x
1 ≡ 1
[Abort(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , msg1)]A
((Has(X, s) ∨ Has(X, r)) ∧ Honest(Tˆ )) ⊃ Has(A, r)
The formal proof of fairness in this scenario involves showing that 1 holds after A executed the ﬁrst part of the
exchange subprotocol, and that 1 holds as long as the trusted third party Tˆ behaves properly. The complete proof of
both statements are given in Appendix B
 Start(A)[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)1]A1 (2)
1T  1 (3)
The fairness property in this case simply follows from the sequential composition theorem (Theorem 1). Recall that
1T is a set of assumptions about the behavior of the trusted third party T deﬁned in Section 4.1. Informally, 
1
T says
that Tˆ will never issue both a replacement contract and the abort token. Therefore, 1T is only going to hold if Tˆ is
completely honest. A misbehaving Tˆ might otherwise cheat on A if A executed the abort protocol after receiving the
ﬁrst message.
Initiator runs the resolve protocol: Finally, we want to show that ifA has received the second message of the protocol,
then it can obtain a valid contract by executing the resolve subprotocol, provided that it created the nonce x itself and
did not send the abort message corresponding to that nonce in the past, i.e., for
2 = New(A, x) ∧ ¬Send(A, Aˆ, Tˆ , SIGAˆ{|Abort,msg1|})
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we deﬁne 2 by
2 ≡ 2
[Resolve(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , msg1,msg2)]A
(Has(X, s) ∨ Has(X, r) ∧
Honest(Tˆ ) ∧ Honest(Aˆ)) ⊃ Has(A, r)
It is easy to verify that 2 holds in the state where A has received the second message of the protocol and sent the
third message of the protocol.
The formal proof of fairness in this scenario involves showing that 2 holds after A executed the ﬁrst part of the
exchange subprotocol, and that 2 holds as long as the trusted third party Tˆ behaves properly. The required fairness
guarantee is obtained by the composition theorem as before. The complete proof of both statements are given in
Appendix B
 Start(A)[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)3]A2 (4)
2T  2 (5)
In this case, the assumption about the behavior of the trusted third party 2T says that Tˆ will never send an abort
token unless A has initiated the abort subprotocol for the corresponding commitment. This completes the proof for
fairness for the initiator in the ASW protocol.
Discussion: Notice that the property we prove in the optimistic part of the protocol is weaker than in the other
two cases. Namely, we only show that the initiator has a contract corresponding to his nonce, it could be possible
that the responder (or attacker) has obtained other contracts corresponding to the same initiator’s nonce and different
responder’s nonce. As demonstrated in [23] that is indeed the case. We rediscovered the same attack when the proof of
the stronger property failed. The following formula does not hold for the protocol:
Start(A)
[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)]A
Has(X, s(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, w)) ⊃ Has(A, s(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, w))
The interpretation of this formula is that no other thread X can have any other standard contract except the one
obtained by A after executing the exchange subprotocol.
Fairness for the responder in the protocol: A similar property can be shown for the responder in the ASW protocol.
The proof structure is identical to the proof for the initiator. For brevity, we do not get into the details.
4.3.2. Accountability
Accountability means that if one of the parties gets cheated as a result of Tˆ ’s misbehavior, that it will be able to hold
Tˆ accountable. More precisely, at the end of every run where an agent gets cheated, its trace together with a contract
of the other party should provide non-repudiable evidence that Tˆ misbehaved.
The ﬁrst step in the formalization of this property is to precisely deﬁne what it means for a set of terms to be a
non-repudiable proof of Tˆ ’s misbehavior. One approach is to require that, assuming the correctness of Tˆ as speciﬁed by
the set of formulas , we can formally derive that if anyone possesses certain terms (typically involving Tˆ ’s signature),
then Honest(Tˆ ) does not hold. It is easy to prove that the replacement contract and the abort token corresponding to
the same nonce constitute non-repudiable proofs that Tˆ misbehaved. Formally, for T := 1T ∪ 2T we prove
T Has(X, r(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text,HASH{|x|}, w)) ∧ Has(A, SIGTˆ {|Aborted,msg1|}) ⊃ ¬Honest(Tˆ )
Again we reason from the initiator’s point of view and consider three scenarios.
Initiator completes the exchange subprotocol: We already proved that A has a contract in that case, regardless of Tˆ ’s
behavior and therefore A cannot get cheated in this case.
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Initiator runs the abort protocol: In this case, we prove two things. Firstly, no one can have a standard contract.
Secondly, after executing the abort subprotocol A will either get the abort token or the replacement contract. Therefore,
if A gets cheated it has to be the case that some other party X has a replacement contract, while A has the abort
token for the corresponding nonce. As explained above, these two terms are non-repudiable proofs that Tˆ misbehaved.
We capture both properties with a single logical formula given below
 1
[Abort(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , msg1)]A
¬Has(X, s) ∧ (Has(A, r) ∨ Has(A, SIG
Tˆ
{|Aborted,msg1|}))
Initiator runs the resolve protocol: This case is similar to the one above, and we omit the details.
4.3.3. Abuse-freeness
Abuse-freeness means that no party can ever prove to the third party that it has the power to both enforce and cancel
the contract. More precisely, a protocol is abuse-free for the initiator if in every state where the responder has publicly
veriﬁable information that the initiator is bound to the contract it has to be that the responder is also bound to the
contract.
Modelling the property that the responder has publicly veriﬁable information that the initiator is bound to the
contract is beyond the scope of the logic. However, if we ﬁx the set of terms t1, . . . , tn that we consider to constitute
such information we can express abuse-freeness for the initiator in the following way: whenever a party X possess
terms t1, . . . , tn, the initiator has a strategy to obtain a contract. As pointed in the long version of [4], the deﬁnition of
abuse-freeness that we are able to prove in the logic is strictly stronger than the standard deﬁnition of abuse-freeness
that we ﬁrst mentioned above.
For the ASW protocol, if we consider the signature in the ﬁrst message as a proof that the initiator is bound to the
contract, it is easy to see that the protocol does not provide this property for the initiator. In the logic, this is reﬂected
in the fact that the proof of the following formula fails:
T  1 ∧ Has(X, SIGAˆ{|Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text,HASH{|x|}|}
[Abort(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , msg1)]A
Honest(Tˆ ) ⊃ Has(A, r)
5. Template for optimistic contract-signing protocols
Both the ASW and GJM protocols consist of three interdependent subprotocols: exchange, abort, and resolve.
The structure of these two protocols suggests a general pattern for two-party optimistic contract-signing protocols.
Speciﬁcally, the exchange subprotocol proceeds in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the two parties commit to the contract
and in the second they open their commitment, in effect, ensuring that they are bound to the contract. Given this
observation, it seems natural to ask if we could provide a uniﬁed representation and proofs for these two protocols and
their properties. In this section, we answer this question in the afﬁrmative.
5.1. Abstraction and reﬁnement methodology
The concept of protocol templates and an abstraction-instantiation method using templates to develop uniﬁed proofs
for related protocols is introduced in [9]. In order to make this paper self-contained, we reproduce the main ideas below.
Protocol templates: A protocol template is a protocol that uses function variables. An example of an abstract
challenge-response based authentication protocol using the informal trace notation is given below
A → B :m
B → A : n, F (B,A, n,m)
A → B :G(A,B,m, n)
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Here, m and n are fresh nonces and F and G are function variables. Substituting cryptographic functions for F and
G with the parameters appropriately ﬁlled in yields real protocols. For example, instantiating F and G to signatures
yields the standard signature-based challenge-response protocol from the ISO-9798-3 family, whereas instantiating F
and G to a keyed hash yields the SKID3 protocol.
Characterizing protocol concepts: Protocol templates provide a useful method for formally characterizing design
concepts. Our methodology for formal proofs involves the following two steps:
(1) Assuming properties of the function variables and some invariants, prove properties of the protocol templates.
Formally,
Q, 1[P ]A2.
Here, Q is an abstract protocol and P is a program for one role of the protocol.  denotes the set of assumed
properties and invariants.
(2) Instantiate the function variables to cryptographic functions and prove that the assumed properties and invariants
are satisﬁed by the real protocol. Hence conclude that the real protocol possesses the security property characterized
by the protocol templates
If Q′ ′, then Q′ ′1[P ′]A′2.
Here, the primed versions of the protocol, hypotheses, etc. are obtained by applying the substitution  used in the
instantiation.
The correctness of the method follows from the soundness of substitution and the transitivity of entailment in the
logic.
5.2. Template for ASW and GJM protocols
The roles of the template for the ASW and GJM protocols are given in Fig. 3. Let us examine the program of
the initiator. Notice that the initiator ﬁrst sends his commitment (commit1), receives the responder’s commitment
(commit2), checks its validity, opens his commitment (open), and ﬁnally expects a message opening the responder’s
commitment. The responder’s program is symmetric. commit1, commit2 and open are function variables representing
the messages sent by Xˆ and Yˆ during the protocol. The function variable chk models the veriﬁcation performed by
each participant after receiving its last message. These functions are instantiated for ASW and GJM as
follows:
ASW :
commit1(Xˆ, Yˆ , Tˆ , text, h) =SIG
Xˆ
{|Xˆ, Yˆ , Tˆ , text, h|}
commit2(Xˆ, Yˆ , Tˆ , text, z, h) =SIG
Xˆ
{|z, h|}
open(Xˆ, text, x) =x
chk(w) =HASH{|w|}
GJM :
commit1(Xˆ, Yˆ , Tˆ , text, h) =PCS
Xˆ
{|text, Yˆ , Tˆ |}
commit2(Xˆ, Yˆ , Tˆ , text, z, h) =PCS
Xˆ
{|text, Yˆ , Tˆ |}




In the ASW instantiation, the commitment messages are signatures over hashed nonces and the opening messages
reveal the corresponding nonces. The veriﬁcation action involves checking that the hash of the revealed nonce matches
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Fig. 3. Roles of the protocol template.
the hash in the commitment message. In the GJM instantiation, a commitment message is a PCS over the contract and
the opening message is the corresponding universally veriﬁable signature. The veriﬁcation action involves verifying
the signature.
To improve readability, we use msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x) and msg2(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y) as shorthand for the ﬁrst and
second message of the exchange subprotocol, i.e.,
msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x)≡ commit1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text,HASH{|x|}),
msg2(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y)≡ commit2(Bˆ, Aˆ, Tˆ , text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x),HASH{|y|}).
The protocol deﬁnition provides two forms of a contract. A standard contract, s, is obtained on successful completion
of the exchange subprotocol. This is the “optimistic’’ aspect of these protocols. A replacement contract, r, is issued
by the trusted third party in case of dispute. The syntactic forms of these contracts for the ASW and GJM protocols as
well as some other message components used in the abort and resolve protocols are given below. Note that we work
with the modiﬁed version of the GJM protocol as presented in [23]. The only difference is that in the resolve protocol,
the responder sends his PCS to the trusted third party instead of his signature
ASW :
abortreq(Aˆ, Bˆ, text,msg1) =SIG
Aˆ
{|Abort,msg1|}
tpabort(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text,msg1) =SIG
Tˆ
{|Aborted, abortreq(Aˆ, Bˆ, text,msg1)|}
tpresp(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y, Zˆ) =SIG
Tˆ
{|msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x),msg2(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y)|}
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s(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y) =msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x),
msg2(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y),
open(Aˆ, text, x), open(Bˆ, text, y)
r(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y) =tpresp(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y, Aˆ)
GJM :
abortreq(Aˆ, Bˆ, text,msg1) =SIG
Aˆ
{|text, Aˆ, Bˆ, Abort |}
tpabort(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text,msg1) =SIG
Tˆ
{|abortreq(Aˆ, Bˆ, text,msg1)|}
tpresp(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y, Zˆ) =open(Zˆ, text, w)
With w = x if Z = A
and w = y if Z = B.
s(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y) =open(Aˆ, text, x), open(Bˆ, text, y)
r(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y) =open(Aˆ, text, x), open(Bˆ, text, y)
We now examine the templates for the abort and resolve subprotocols, also given in Fig. 3. The initiator A has the
option of requesting the trusted third party T to abort an exchange that A has initiated by executing the abort subpro-
tocol with T. Finally, both the initiator and the responder may request that T resolve an exchange that has not
been completed by executing the resolve subprotocol with T.
We model the trusted third party’s behavior using a set T of logical formulas. It is straightforward to write down
the program for the trusted third party and establish these properties using the honesty rule for PCL (see Appendix A).
In the same way, we will capture the desired behavior of the variable functions commit1, commit2, open and chk using a
set of logical formulas, and show that both ASW and GJM satisfy.1T is the same assumption about the behavior of
the trusted third party T as in Section 4. It says that if T is honest, then it will never issue both a replacement contract and
the abort token. Naturally, a misbehaving trusted third party T could easily cheat on any of the participants. Formally,
1T is deﬁned as follows:
1T = {Honest(T ) ∧ Send(T , Tˆ , Zˆ, tpresp(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, z, Zˆ′)) ⊃ ¬Send(T , Tˆ , Aˆ, tpabort(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text,
msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x)))}.
2T is the second assumption about the behavior of the trusted third party. It says that T will abort the protocol (by
sending the abort token) only if she received an abort request from the initiator
2T = {Send(T , Tˆ , Aˆ, tpabort(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x)))
⊃ Receive(T , Aˆ, Tˆ , abortreq(Aˆ, Bˆ, text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x)))}.
Other instances: Although we focus on the ASW and GJM instances, we note that simple variants of the non-
repudiation protocols of [20,21,25] are also instances of this template. Speciﬁcally, these variants are similar to the
ASW protocol, the only difference being that the hash of the nonce is replaced by the encryption of nonce with a secret
key which is later revealed in the decommit message. This indicates that the template provides a characterization of a
broad class of optimistic contract-signing protocols. We are aware of only one timely, optimistic fair exchange protocol
that substantially differs from our template [24]. The protocol in [24] is started by the responder sending a speciﬁc
generation message that serves as a characterization of the considered secret, and that can be used to circumvent the
prevalent commitment-based message ﬂows.
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5.3. Hypotheses associated with the template
We prove the security properties of the protocol template under the following hypotheses. It is easy to check that
these assumptions are satisﬁed when the template is instantiated to the ASW and GJM protocols. We omit the rather
straightforward proofs. One way to think about these hypotheses is that they represent general high-level speciﬁcations
that wemight expect any optimistic contract-signing protocols to satisfy. They can be naturally divided into two classes:
 Has(Z,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x)) ∧
Has(Z,msg2(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y)) ∧
Has(Z, open(Aˆ, text, x)) ∧ (6)
Has(Z, open(Bˆ, text, y)) ⊃ Has(Z, s(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y))
 Has(A, text, x) ⊃
Has(A,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x), open(Aˆ, text, x)) (7)
 Has(Z,w) ∧ Has(Z, commit2(Bˆ, Aˆ, Tˆ , text,m, y))[match chk(w)/open(Aˆ, text, y)]Z
Has(Z, commit2(Bˆ, Aˆ, Tˆ , text,m,HASH{|w|}), open(Aˆ, text, w)) (8)
 Has(Z, s(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y)) ⊃
Has(Z, open(Aˆ, text, x)) (9)
The ﬁrst class of assumptions identify the message components that a principal must possess in order to obtain a
standard contract. (6) states that any participant possessing the four messages exchanged in the “optimistic” protocol
execution also possess the standard contract. It would be strange if an optimistic contract-signing protocol did not
satisfy this property! (7) states that an initiator A has enough information to produce the ﬁrst and third messages of
an optimistic protocol exchange. (8) ensures that given two messages from the responder, the chk function allows the
initiator to verify that these messages constitute a valid commit–open pair. Finally, (9) shows that given a valid contract,
one can extract the initiator’s open message from it. These assumptions are discharged for the instances based purely
on the properties of the functions used to construct the open and commit messages (e.g., in order to compute the hash
of a message, it is essential to possess the message).
 Has(Z, r(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y)) ∧ Honest(Tˆ ) ⊃ ∃Z′.∃Z′′
Send(T , Zˆ′, tpresp(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y, Zˆ′′)) ∨ Has(Z, open(Aˆ, text, x)) (10)
 Has(Z, open(Aˆ, text, x)) ∧ ¬Send(A, open(Aˆ, text, x)) ∧
Honest(Tˆ , Aˆ) ∧ New(A, x) ⊃ (Z = A) ∨ ∃Z′.∃Z′′
Send(T , Zˆ′, tpresp(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y, Zˆ′′)) (11)
 Has(Z, tpresp(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y, Bˆ), open(A, text, x)) ⊃
Has(Z, r(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y)) (12)
The second class of assumptions capture the hardness of constructing the replacement contract. More precisely, (10)
states that the only ways to acquire a replacement contract are to get it from the trusted third party or to construct it
from the open messages, while (11) states that the open message for the initiator can only be computed by initiator
herself or extracted from the replacement contract issued by the trusted third party. Also, (12) states that given the
initiator’s opening message and the response of the trusted third party to an accepted resolve request, one can build the
replacement contract. These assumptions are discharged in the template instances based on the relations between the
various open and commit messages as well as the protocol steps of the various parties.
5.4. Proving template properties
In this section, we prove the security properties of the protocol template. We focus on fairness; the proof of account-
ability is analogous. Abuse-freeness for the GJM protocol reduces to fairness, because of the properties of PCSs.
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5.4.1. Fairness
The proof structure parallels that of theASW fairness proof, the only difference being that weworkwith the templates
instead of the concrete protocols. Some steps in the proof use the hypotheses listed in the previous section.
Initiator completes the exchange protocol: Formula0 states that the initiatorAhas a valid contract after the successful
execution of the exchange protocol. This is the optimistic part of the protocol.
0 ≡ Start(A)
[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)]A
Has(A, s)
We formally show in Appendix B that
0. (13)
Initiator runs the abort protocol: Consider the case that A started the protocol as the initiator but did not complete
it. We then want to show that whenever some other party has a valid contract then it must be the case that A will get
the replacement contract if it executes abort subprotocol after sending the ﬁrst message. A necessary prerequisite for
this to hold is that A’s open message was not sent yet, i.e., for
1 = ¬Send(A, open(Aˆ, text, x)) ∧ New(A, x)
we deﬁne the formula 1 by
1 ≡ 1
[Abort(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , msg1)]A
(Has(X, s) ∨ Has(X, r)) ∧ Honest(Tˆ ) ∧ Honest(Aˆ) ⊃ (Has(A, s) ∨ Has(A, r))
It is easy to verify that 1 holds in the state where A has only sent the ﬁrst message of the protocol. We formally
show in Appendix B that
Start(A)[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)1]A1 (14)
1T 1 (15)
The fairness property in this case follows from the sequential composition theorem. Here 1T is the same assumption
about the behavior of the trusted third party T as in Section 4. It says that if T is honest, then it will never issue both a
replacement contract and the abort token.
Initiator runs the resolve protocol: Finally, we show that if A has received the second message of the protocol then
it can obtain a valid contract by executing the resolve subprotocol, provided that he did not abort the protocol in the
part, i.e., for
2 = ¬Send(A, Aˆ, Tˆ , abortreq(Aˆ, Bˆ, text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x))) ∧ New(A, x)
we deﬁne 2 by
2 ≡ 2
[Resolve(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , msg1,msg2)]A
(Has(X, s) ∨ Has(X, r)) ∧ Honest(Tˆ ) ∧ Honest(Aˆ) ⊃ Has(A, r)
It is easy to verify that 2 holds in the state where A has received the second message and sent the third message of
the protocol. To formally prove fairness from the point of view of the initiator (assuming the desired properties of the
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trusted third party), we need to show the following:
Start(A)[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)3]A2 (16)
2T 2 (17)
Here 2T is the second assumption about the behavior of the trusted third party. It says that T will abort the protocol
(by sending the abort token) only if she received an abort request from the initiator.
6. Conclusion
We show how to reason compositionally about contract-signing protocols, using a specialized protocol logic to prove
properties about general forms of exchange, abort, and resolve subprotocols and combine these properties using logical
composition rules. The method is surprisingly direct for contract signing, given that the logic we used was originally
aimed at two-party authentication protocols. The formal proof proceeds along direct, intuitive lines and is carried out
in a “template’’ form that may be instantiated to provide correctness proofs for two standard protocols and protocol
variants that use the same arrangement of messages. In addition, the compositional approach makes it unnecessary
to consider interleaving of actions from different subprotocols. This is fortunate since interaction between separate
subprotocols appears to have been a signiﬁcant source of difﬁculty in previous studies. Further, the use of protocol
templates gives us a single “reusable’’ proof that may be instantiated for the Asokan–Shoup–Waidner protocol [1,2],
the Garay–Jacobson–McKenzie [15] protocol, and other protocols such as variants using the primitives explored in
[20,25]. In this sense, we prove the relatively intuitive but otherwise difﬁcult to state theorem that any protocol of a
certain form has precise correctness properties.
Contract-signing fairness for party A is proved by explicit reasoning about speciﬁc actions taken by A. In effect,
this form of argument shows that A has a strategy to obtain a contract by explicitly presenting the strategy. How-
ever, the logic is not suited to showing directly that it is possible to complete these steps—that is a modelling as-
sumption that remains outside the formalism. Further, the safety-oriented logic seems less adept at non-trace-based
properties such as abuse freeness than game-theoretic approaches. Nonetheless, these axiomatic, general proofs for un-
bounded runs offer additional validation of optimistic contract-signing protocols not readily available through previous
approaches.
Appendix A. Protocol composition logic
A.1. Semantics
The formulas of the logic are interpreted over runs, which are ﬁnite sequences of reaction steps from an initial
conﬁguration. An equivalent view is to think of a run as a linear sequence of states. Transition from one state to the
next is effected by an action carried out by some principal in some role. A formula is true in a run if it is true in the last
state of that run.
The main semantic relation, Q, R , may be read, “formula  holds for run R of protocol Q.’’ If Q is a protocol,
then let Q¯ be the set of all initial conﬁgurations of protocolQ, each including a possible intruder program. Let Runs(Q¯)
be the set of all runs of protocol Q with intruder, each a sequence of reaction steps within a cord space. If  has free
variables, then Q,R  if we have Q,R   for all substitutions  that eliminate all the free variables in . For a set
of formulas , we say that  if Q, R  implies Q, R . We write Q if Q, R  for all R ∈ Runs(Q¯).
In the following, EVENT(R,X, P, n, x) means that in run R, thread X executes actions P, receiving data n into
variables x, where n and x are the same length.
Action formulas:
• Q, R Send(A,m) if EVENT(R,A, send m,∅,∅).
• Q, R Receive(A,m) if EVENT(R,A, receive x,m, x).
• Q, R New(A,m) if EVENT(R,A, new x,m, x).
• Q, R Decrypt(A,ENCK{|m|}) if EVENT(R,A, (match ENCK{|m|}/SIGK{|x|}),m, x)
Note: Decrypt(A, n) is false if n = ENCK{|m|} for some m and K.
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• Q, R Verify(A, SIGK{|m|}) if EVENT(R,A, (match SIGK{|m|}/ENCK{|m|}),∅,∅)
Note: Verify(A, n) is false if n = SIGK{|m|} for some m and K.
Other formulas:
• Q, R Has(A,m) if there exists an i such that Hasi (A,m) where Hasi is inductively as follows:
(Has0(A,m) if ((m ∈ FV (R|A))
∨ EVENT(R,A, new x,m, x)
∨ EVENT(R,A, receive x,m, x)
and Hasi+1(A,m) if Hasi (A,m)∨ (Hasi (A,m′)
∨ (Hasi (A,m′) ∧ Hasi (A,m′′)
∧ ((m = m′,m′′) ∨ (m = m′′,m′)))
∨(Hasi (A,m′) ∧ Hasi (A,K)
∧ m = ENCK{|m′|})
∨(Hasi (A, a) ∧ Hasi (A, gb)
∧ m = gab)
∨(Hasi (A, gab) ∧ m = gba)
Intuitively, Has0 holds for terms that are known directly, either as a free variable of the role, or as the direct result of
receiving or generating the term. Hasi+1 holds for terms that are known by applying i operations (decomposing via
pattern matching, composing via encryption or tupling, or by computing a Difﬁe–Hellman secret) to terms known
directly.
• Q, R Honest(Aˆ) if Aˆ ∈ HONEST(C) in initial conﬁguration C for R and all threads of Aˆ are in a “pausing” state
in R. More precisely, R|
Aˆ
is an interleaving of basic sequences of roles in Q.
• Q, R Contains(t1, t2) if t2 ⊆ t1.
• Q, R  (1 ∧ 2) if Q, R 1 and Q, R 2.
• Q, R ¬ if Q, R  .
• Q, R  ∃x. if Q, R  (d/x), for some d , where (d/x) denotes the formula obtained by substituting d for x in
.
• Q, R Start(X) if R|X is empty. Intuitively this formula means that X did not execute any actions in the past.
Modal formulas:
• Q, R 1 [P ]A 2 if R = R0R1R2, for some R0, R1 and R2, and either P does not match R1|A or P matches R1|A
and Q, R0  1 implies Q, R0R1  2, where  is the substitution matching P to R1|A.
A.2. Proof system
A.2.1. Axioms and inference rules
The axioms and inference rules of the proof system that are used in this paper are collected in Table A1. AA1
states that if a principal has executed an action in some role, then the corresponding predicate asserting that the action
had occurred in the past is true. VER captures the unforgetability of signatures of honest principals by the attacker.
This axiom (together with a few more axioms not described in this summary) provide an abstraction of the standard
Dolev–Yao intruder model. Axioms P1 and P3 capture the fact that most predicates are preserved by additional actions.
For example, if in some state Has(X, n) holds, then it continues to hold, when X executes additional actions. The
generic rules are used to reason about modal formulas in the style of Floyd–Hoare logic. The conditional rule is used
for reasoning about the “if” construct introduced in this paper.
A.2.2. The honesty rule
The honesty rule is essentially an invariance rule for proving properties of all roles of a protocol. It is similar to the
basic invariance rule of LTL [19]. The honesty rule is used to combine facts about one role with inferred actions of
other roles.
For example, suppose Alice receives a response from a message sent to Bob. Alice may wish to use properties of
Bob’s role to reason about how Bob generated his reply. In order to do so, Alice may assume that Bob is honest and
derive consequences from this assumption. Since honesty, by deﬁnition in this framework, means “following one or
more roles of the protocol,” honest principals must satisfy every property that is a provable invariant of the protocol
roles.
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Table A1
Relevant Fragment of the PCL proof system
Axioms for protocol actions
AA1 true[a]X a
AA2 Start(X)[ ]X ¬a(X)
AA3 ¬Send(X, t)[b]X¬Send(X, t) if Send(X, t) = b for all substitutions 
AN2 true[new x]X Has(Y, x) ⊃ (Y = X)
ARP Receive(X, p(x))[match q(x)/q(t)]X Receive(X, p(t))
Possession Axioms
ORIG New(X, x) ⊃ Has(X, x)
REC Receive(X, x) ⊃ Has(X, x)
TUP Has(X, x) ∧ Has(X, y) ⊃ Has(X, (x, y))
PROJ Has(X, (x, y)) ⊃ Has(X, x) ∧ Has(X, y)
SIG Has(X, SIG
Yˆ
{|x|}) ⊃ Has(X, x)
Signature
VER Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Verify(Y, SIG
Xˆ




Persist ∈ {Has, a}:
P1 Persist(X, t)[a]XPersist(X, t)
P3 HasAlone(X, n)[a]XHasAlone(X, n), where n ⊆v a or a = 〈m〉
HasAlone(X, t) ≡ Has(X, t) ∧ (Has(Y, t) ⊃ X = Y )
Generic Rules
[P ]X [P ]X
[P ]X ∧  G1





[match t/t1;P1]1 [match t/t2;P2]2 . . . [match t/tn;Pn]n
[if t t1 : P1; t2 : P2; . . . tn : Pn;fi ]1 ∨ 2 ∨ . . . ∨ n IF
Table B1



















[receiveA, Bˆ, Aˆ, w; matchHASH{|w|}/y]A




[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)]A
Has(A, s(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y)) (B.5)
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Table B2
Proof of Eq. (2)
AA1,ORIG,AN2 Start(A)
[new x]A
Has(A, x) ∧ (Has(B, x) ⊃ (B = A)) (B.6)
(B.6),P3 Start(A)
[new x;send Aˆ, Bˆ,msg1]A
HasAlone(A, x) (B.7)
(B.7) Start(A)
[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)1]A
1 (B.8)
Table B3
Proof of Eq. (3)
P3 HasAlone(A, x)
[Abort(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , msg1)]A
HasAlone(A, x) (B.9)
PROJ Has(X, s) ⊃ Has(X, x) (B.10)
(B.10),P3 HasAlone(A, x) ∧ A = X ⊃ ¬Has(X, s) (B.11)
(B.11) ¬Send(B, s) ∧ A = B ⊃ ¬Has(A, s) (B.12)
VER Honest(Tˆ ) ∧ Verify(X, r) ∧ Xˆ = Tˆ ⊃ Send(T , Tˆ , Xˆ, r) (B.13)
1T , (B.11)–(B.13) HasAlone(A, x) ∧ (Has(X, s) ∨ Has(X, r))




[Abort(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , msg1)]A
(Has(X, s) ∨ Has(X, r)) ∧ Honest(Tˆ )
⊃ Has(A, r) (B.15)
Table B4
Proof of Eq. (4)
AA2 Start(A)
[]A
¬Send(A, Aˆ, Tˆ , SIG
Aˆ
{|Abort,msg1|}) (B.16)
AA1 [New(x)]ANew(A, x) (B.17)
(B.16), (B.17),AA3 Start(A)
[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)3]A
2 (B.18)
Since the honesty rule depends on the protocol, we write Q  [P ] if [P ] is provable using the honesty rule for
Q and the other axioms and proof rules. Using the notation just introduced, the honesty rule may be written as follows:
[ ]X  ∀	 ∈ Q.∀P 
BS(	).  [P ]X 
Q Honest(Xˆ) ⊃  HON
no free variable
in  except X
bound in [P ]X
In other words, if  holds at the beginning of every role of Q and is preserved by all its basic sequences, then every
honest principal executing protocol Q must satisfy . The side condition prevents free variables in the conclusion
Honest(Xˆ) ⊃  from becoming bound in any hypothesis. Intuitively, since  holds in the initial state and is preserved
by all basic sequences, it holds at all pausing states of any run.
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Table B5
Proof of Eq. (5)
VER,HON Honest(Aˆ) ∧ Aˆ = Tˆ ∧ Receive(T , Aˆ, Tˆ , SIG
Aˆ
{|Abort,msg1|})
⊃ Send(A, Aˆ, Tˆ , SIG
Aˆ
{|Abort,msg1|}) (B.19)
(B.19), 2 ∧ Honest(Aˆ) ∧ Aˆ = Tˆ
⊃ ¬Receive(T , Aˆ, Tˆ , SIG
Tˆ
{|Aborted,msg1|}) (B.20)
(B.20),2T 2 ∧ Honest(Aˆ) ∧ Aˆ = Tˆ




[Resolve(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , msg1,msg2)]A
(Has(X, s) ∨ Has(X, r)) ∧ Honest(Tˆ ) ⊃ Has(A, r) (B.22)
Table B6
Proof of Eq. (13)
AA1,ORIG,G2 Start(A)[new x]AHas(A, x) (B.23)
(B.23), (7),G2 Start(A)
[new x]A
Has(A,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x),
open(Aˆ, text, x)) (B.24)
AA1,ARP,REC 
[receiveA, Bˆ, Aˆ, z;
match z/commit2(Bˆ, Aˆ, Tˆ , text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x), y)]A
Has(A, commit2(Bˆ, Aˆ, Tˆ , text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x), y)) (B.25)
AA1,REC, (8),S1 Has(A, commit2(Bˆ, Aˆ, Tˆ , text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x), y))
[receiveA, Bˆ, Aˆ, w;
match chk(w)/open(Bˆ, text, y)]A
Has(A, open(Bˆ, text, w),msg2(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, w)) (B.26)
(B.24), (B.26),P1, (6),G2 
[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)]A
Has(A, s(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y)) (B.27)
Table B7
Proof of Eq. (14)
AA1,P1,AN2 Start(A)
[new x;send Aˆ, Bˆ,msg1(Aˆ, Tˆ , text, x)]A
New(A, x) (B.28)
AA3 Start(A)
[new x;send Aˆ, Bˆ,msg1(Aˆ, Tˆ , text, x)]A
¬Send(A, open(Aˆ, text, x)) (B.29)
(B.28), (B.29),G1 Start(A)
[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)1]A
1 (B.30)
Appendix B. Formal proofs
Formal proofs are collected in Tables B1–B10.
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Table B8
Proof of Eq. (16)
AA2 Start(A)
[]A
¬Send(A, abortreq(Aˆ, Bˆ, text,msg1)) (B.31)
AA1 [New(x)]ANew(A, x) (B.32)
(B.31), (B.32),AA3 Start(A)
[ExchangeInit(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text)3]A
2 (B.33)
Table B9
Proof of Eq. (15)
 = Honest(T ) ∧ Honest(A) ∧ (Has(Z, s(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , x, y)) ∨ Has(Z, r(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , x, y)))
(10), (11), (9) 1 ∧ 
⊃ (Z = A) ∨ ∃Z′.∃Z′′.Send(T , Zˆ′, tpresp(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y, Zˆ′′)) (B.34)
(B.34), (15) 1 ∧ 
⊃ (Z = A) ∨ ¬Send(T , Tˆ , Aˆ, tpabort(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x))) (B.35)
(B.35) 1 ∧ 
⊃ (Z = A) ∨ ¬Receive(A, Tˆ , Aˆ, tpabort(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x))) (B.36)
(B.36), IF,P1 1[Abort]A
⊃ (Z = A) ∨ Receive(A, Tˆ , Aˆ, tpresp(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y, Bˆ)) (B.37)
(B.37),REC 1[Abort]A
⊃ (Z = A) ∨ Has(A, tpresp(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x, y, Bˆ)) (B.38)
(B.38), (12) 1[Abort]A
⊃ Has(A, s(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , x, y)) ∨ Has(A, r(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , x, y))
Table B10
Proof of Eq. (17)
VER Honest(Aˆ) ∧ Aˆ = Tˆ ∧ Receive(T , Aˆ, Tˆ , abortreq(Aˆ, Bˆ, text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x))) (B.39)
⊃ Send(A, Aˆ, Tˆ , abortreq(Aˆ, Bˆ, text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x))) (B.40)
(B.40) 2 ∧ Honest(Aˆ) ∧ Aˆ = Tˆ
⊃ ¬Receive(T , Aˆ, Tˆ , abortreq(Aˆ, Bˆ, text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x))) (B.41)
(B.41),2T 2 ∧ Honest(Aˆ) ∧ Aˆ = Tˆ
⊃ ¬Send(T , Tˆ , Aˆ, abortreq(Aˆ, Bˆ, text,msg1(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ , text, x))) (B.42)
(B.42), IF 2[Resolve]AHonest(Tˆ ) ∧ Honest(Aˆ) ∧ (Has(X, s) ∨ Has(X, r))
⊃ Has(A, r) (B.43)
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